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Id. t t tt See also Schreiber v. Burlington Northern, Inc. Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green

Id. t Id. t citing United States v. Oregon , Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB , accord, e.g., Aaron v. Securities and Exchange Commission

Aaron v. SEC Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. \_\_\_\_\_T \_\_\_\_ P. P. t. citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder Ottman v. Hanger Orthopedic Group, Inc. SEC v. Monarch Funding Corp.

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 18 CFR Part 1c: Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation: Final Rule

Id. 1

Id. t accord, id. t citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder t Aaron v. SEC

Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder

, accord, e.g., Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. \_\_\_\_\_T \_\_\_\_P P t \_\_\_\_\_\_I nre Worlds of Wonder Securities Litigation tb cert. denied t , Loveridge v. Dreagoux tb

Commission Takes Preliminary Action in Two Major Market Manipulation Cases t t t

Id. 1

Id., citing Dennis v. United States

Id. 1

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  - Id. t citing United States v. Persky , Todd & Co. v. SEC

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## IV. Particular Questions For Commenters

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A. Defining Market Manip	bula	tior	1	

P t t<sup>b</sup> w Market manipulation shall mean knowingly using or employing, directly or indirectly, a manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance —

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all other transactions and practices, irrespective of their legality under the antitrust laws, that tend to increase prices relative to costs and to reduce output. Id. t  $\dots Pb$ . the best  $p_1 p_2 p_3 \dots p_{10} \dots p_{10}$ 

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