# Data, Privacy Laws, and Firm Production:

Growing Importance of Data for Firms & Privacy Laws

Data

### Growing Importance of Data for Firms & Privacy Laws

- Data plays an important and growing role in firm production
- New privacy regulations have emerged to govern data collection, storage, and analysis
- EU's General Data Protection Regulation: comprehensive and consequential privacy law
  - A ected over 20M firms across many countries that target EU residents (no min. size threshold)

### Growing Importance of Data for Firms & Privacy Laws

Data plays an important and growing role in firm production

· New

### Production Approach: GDPR as Increased Cost of Managing Data

- These regulations increase the cost of data to firms and a ect their input choices
  - Generate a wedge between the marginal product of data and its price (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009)
  - A ect firms' data and computation choices

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Literature focused on firm outcomes, little evidence on firms' margins of adjustment / choices Requires a framework to analyze how firms use and process data

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### This paper:

- 1. How do firms combine data and computation in production?
- 2. What is the cost of the GDPR for firms, and how do they adjust their data/computation inputs?

### Data and Methods

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- Event study: Compare data and computation of EU firms (treated) relative to US (control)
  - Data directly targeted by regulation; computation a ected through firm re-optimization/substitution
- Production function: CES tech. to combine data and computation in information production
- GDPR is \_\_\_\_\_

### **Preview of Results**

### 1. GPDR significantly changes data-compute input mix: firms become less "data intensive"

- Stored data 26%; computation 15% (both in EU relative to US)

2. Data and computation are strong complements: elasticity of substitution is 0.3-0.4

# Preview of Results

- 1.

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### Contribution to the Literature

### 1. The impact of the GDPR on firms

online tracking (Aridor et al., 2022; Lefrere et al., 2022; Lukic et al., 2023); business ventures (Jia et al., 2021); app development (Kircher and Foerderer, 2020; Janßen et al., 2021; Kircher and Foerderer, 2023); third-party ads (Johnson et al., 2022; Peukert et al., 2022); e-commerce revenue (Goldberg et al., 2023); e ectiveness of targeted ads (Aridor et al., 2022; Matos and Adjerid, 2022); profits, and sales (Koski and Valmari, 2020; Chen et al., 2022); internet interconnectivity (Zhuo et al., 2021); + many others

### Study the key margin targeted by privacy laws: data Study firms' choices rather than outcomes using a production approach

### Contribution to the Literature

1. The impact of the GDPR on firms

### 2. Data as an input to the production of goods and services

(e.g., Jones and Tonetti, 2020; Cong et al., 2021; Farboodi and Veldkamp, 2022)

Empirical analysis of how firms use data and computation in a production approach The first paper to incorporate and estimate both data and computation in firm production

### Contribution to the Literature

- 1. The impact of the GDPR on firms
- 2. Data as an input to the production of goods and services
- 3. Economics of privacy

### 4. Literature on misallocation

(Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Restuccia and Rogerson, 2017)

Model privacy regulation costs as a wedge to study GDPR compliance costs

### **Presentation Outline**

- 1. Introduction
- 2. Institutional Setting
- 3. DiD Estimates of the Impact of GDPR
- 4. Production Function Framework
- 5. The Production Cost of GDPR
- 6. Conclusions

Introduction

# 2 Institutional Setting

DiD Estimates of the Impact of GDPR

Production Function Framework

The Production Cost of GDPR

Conclusions

# 2 Institutional Setting

2.1 The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)

2.2 Cloud Computing and Data

### What is the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)?

- Description: Passed in April 2016 and went into e ect in May 2018
  - Replaced and harmonized Data Protection Directive from 1995
- Scope: GDPR applies to firms located in EU or collecting "personal data" from EU residents
  - Protections apply to employee and customer data (e.g., IP addresses, location, shift schedules)
- Enforcement: Supervisory authorities in EU states enforce the regulation
  - Upon request, firms must be able to demonstrate their compliance
- Compliance: Heterogeneity in cost and timing of compliance

Imposes a set of <u>company obligations</u> to protect data in addition to individual rights

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### Fixed Variable

#### Firm Responsibilities under GDPR:

Costs Costs

- 1. Operational changes: privacy notices, employee training (Art. 25)
- 2. Designation / hiring of data protection o cers (Art. 37)
- 3. Handling customer delete/transfer requests expeditiously (Art. 14)
- 4. Records of processing activities, impact assessment and analysis (Art. 37)
- 5. Data security: increase security requirements, breach notification (Art. 32)
- 6. Increased liabilities with penalties up to 4% of *global* revenue (Art. 83)

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### GDPR A ects a Wide Range of Industries and Firms

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**Publicly Reported GDPR Fines** 

# 2 Institutional Setting

- 2.1 The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)
- 2.2 Cloud Computing and Data

# Our Data Source: Cloud Computing

Cloud providers o er on-demand

### Our Data Source: Cloud Computing

- · Cloud providers o er on-demand access to scalable IT resources through the Internet
- Firms request storage

Some Examples of How Firms Use the Cloud

- 1. <u>Cloud data</u>: detailed cloud usage from one of the largest service providers
  - Types: storage (gigabytes) and computation (number of cores × number of hours)
  - Unit of observation: firm-service-server location-month (e.g., MIT, Compute, East Coast, May/18)
  - Observe list prices and paid prices

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#### Limitations:

- We have limited knowledge on how firms use data stored in the cloud
- May not capture all data and computation: multi-cloud and traditional IT

- 1. Cloud data: detailed cloud usage from one of the largest service providers
- 2. Aberdeen/Harte-Hanks: establishment level technology adoption (including cloud)
  - Observe 2.5 million US and 2 million EU establishments
  - Provides information on the extensive margin of cloud adoption and multi-homing
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1. <u>Cloud data</u>: detailed cloud usage from one of the largest service providers

2. Aberdeen/Harte-Hanks: establishment level technology adoption (including cloud)

- 3. Duns & Bradstreet and Orbis: information on industry classification and employment
  - Unit of observation: firm
  - Employment information available only for EU firms (fuzzy matching algorithm)
### Summary Statistics: Top 8 Industries in Sample

Industry	Firms (%)	in EU (%)	Computation (%)	Storage (%)
Services	42.6	40.9	36.3	31.9
Software	25.4	59.8	17.6	20.8
Manufacturing	8.3	54.4	10.5	11.6
Retail Trade	5.8	46.9	5.2	5.4
Finance & Insurance	5.5	44.9	11.4	10.8
Wholesale Trade	5.2	52.3	3.7	4.5
Transportation	3.4	41.7	6.5	6.4
Construction	1.8	46.9	1.9	1.9

#### Main Empirical Specification

- Challenge: Lack of a natural control group due to regulation spillovers (Johnson, 2023)
- · Idea: We observe the data centers firms use in addition to the country of origin
  - Treated firms: firms in the EU that store data only in EU data centers (domestic EU)
  - **Control firms**: firms in the US that store data <u>only</u> in US data centers (domestic US) Eliminates multi-national firms
- Sample: EU and US firms who continuously use the cloud 24-13 months before the GDPR
- Use di erence-in-di erences with flexible trends by industry and pre-GDPR usage deciles











# Estimated Long-run E

### Estimated Long-run E ects by Industry (Two Years After GDPR)

 Primary findings are the same across all industry groups

Largest e ect in manufacturing

Suggestive that data and computation are less essential for manufacturing firms



### Summary: GDPR Changes Firms' Data and Computation Input Choices

#### Additional Analyses:

- 1. Results not driven by di erences in prices between US and EU
- 2. Substitution (to other cloud providers, or in-house IT) unlikely to explain results
- 3. Larger e ect sizes, but not statistically significant wrt. country's enforcement strictness (Goldberg et al., 2023; Johnson, 2022)

#### Key Takeaways:

- 1. GDPR changed firms' data and computation input choices
- 2. Results suggestive of a <u>wedge</u> between marginal product of storing data and its price
- Next: Model firms' input decisions using production framework to quantify the GDPR cost

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# **4 Production Function Framework**

The Production Cost of GDPR

Conclusions

Firms produce information ( ) by using data ( ) and computing ( ) w/ CES tech:

- : (unobserved) exogenous compute technology
- = 1/(1 ): the elasticity of substitution parameter, industry-specific

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• We model GDPR as an increase in the marginal cost of data storage by (1 + ):

**Pre-GDPR:**  $\tilde{}$  = **Post-GDPR:**  $\tilde{}$  =  $(1 + ) \cdot$ 

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Cost-minimization FOCs w.r.t. data and compute post-GDPR for EU firms is:

(Doraszelski and Jaumandreu, 2018; Raval, 2019; Demirer, 2020)



Use equation to identify and using US/EU, pre/post GDPR variation + shift-share design

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# **4 Production Function Framework**

4.1 Estimation Results



## sticity of Substitution for EU Firms

strong complements; more so than "traditional inputs"



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# 5 The Production Cost of GDPR

Conclusions

# 5 The Production Cost of GDPR

## 5.1 Changes in the Cost of Data Storage

5.2 Changes in the Cost of Information Production

### Average GDPR Wedge is 20% with Important Heterogeneity

#### Average Wedge by Industry 0.24 Software 0.17 Services 0.17 Manufacturing 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 Average Wedge

GDPR 20% tax on price of storing data

#### Average GDPR Wedge is 20% with Important Heterogeneity

#### Average Wedge by Industry



GDPR 20% tax on price of storing data

Firms where information is likely more important face larger costs:

- Software ( 24%) vs Manufacturing ( 17%)

### Average GDPR Wedge is 20% with Important Heterogeneity

#### Wedge Distribution



GDPR 20% tax on price of storing data

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What explains the large cost heterogeneity?

## Wedges Negatively Correlated with Firm Size (Employment)

#### Larger firms face lower wedges, consistent with the literature



(Campbell et al., 2015; Koski and Valmari, 2020; Goldberg et al., 2023)

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# 5 The Production Cost of GDPR

5.1 Changes in the Cost of Data Storage

5.2 Changes in the Cost of Information Production

#### How Much Does GDPR Increase the Cost of Producing Information?

From CES production function, the cost of producing a unit of information (without subscripts):

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• From CES production function, the cost of producing a unit of information (without subscripts):

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heterogeneity depends on prices, compute productivity, elasticity of substitution, and wedges

Calculate <u>counterfactual information cost</u> without GDPR (= 0)

With GDPR: 
$$(, , =)$$
 Without GDPR:  $(, , = 0)$ 

## Average Increase in Information Cost is Only 3.7%



#### Avg. Increase in Information Cost by Industry

Information cost increases only by 3.7% on average, with important heterogeneity

# Average Increase in Information Cost is Only 3.7%

Avg. Increase in Information Cost by Industry	

# Average Increase in Information Cost is Only 3.7%



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# 6 Conclusions

### Conclusion

### What We Do:

Use a production approach to study the e ects on GDPR on data and computation

#### **Results:**

- DiD estimates suggest that GDPR reduced firm demand for data and computation:
  - Firm storage declined by 26%; computing declined by 15%
- Data and computation are strong complements in production function
- Production function framework estimates GDPR 20% tax on data storage:
  - This leads to only 4% increase in the cost of information because it targets cheaper input
  - Total production costs are lower ( 1%) since information expenditure shares tend to be low