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FTC Bureau of Economics Working Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate discussion and critical comment. The analyses and conclusions set forth are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of other members of the Bureau of Economics, other Commission staff, or the Commission itself. References in publications to FTC Bureau of Economics Working Papers by FTC economists (other than acknowledgment by a writer that he has access to such unpublished materials) should be cleared with the author to protect the tentative character of these papers.

Working Papers are in PDF format. If you have trouble accessing one of these papers, please email ReportRequests@ftc.gov.

Regulatory Restrictions on Vertical Integration and Control: The Competitive Impact of Gasoline Divorcement Policies

Authors
Michael G. Vita
Working Paper
227

Gasoline "divorcement" regulations restrict the integration of gasoline refiners and retailers. Theoretically, vertical integration can harm competition, making it possible that divorcement policies

R&D Activity and Acquisitions in High Technology Industries: Evidence from the U.S. Electronic and Electrical Equipment Industries

Authors
Bruce A. Blonigen and Christopher T. Taylor
Working Paper
222

Theory argues that R&D intensity and acquisition activity may be either directly or inversely related. However, empirically we know relatively little about which firms are responsible for acquisition

Entry Policy and Entry Subsidies

Authors
James D. Reitzes and Oliver R. Grawe
Working Paper
212

This paper provides a theory that explains why government allow free entry and selectively promote entry under certain conditions and deter entry under other conditions. The analysis also identifies

The Political Economy of Â鶹´«Ã½ Trade Commission Administrative Decision Making in Merger Â鶹´«Ã½

Authors
Malcolm B. Coate and Andrew N. Kleit
Working Paper
210

Firms seeking to merge face antitrust scrutiny from either the Department of Justice (DOJ) or the Â鶹´«Ã½ Trade Commission (FTC). Unlike the DOJ, the FTC litigates its cases in front of its own